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NOTES & COMMENTS
VASAP: A REHABILITATION ALTERNATIVE TO
TRADITIONAL DWI PENALTIES
Alcohol is the largest single factor leading to fatal crashes on our na-
tion's highways.' Although the Commonwealth of Virginia has a lower
percentage of alcohol-related highway fatalities than the national average,
2
in recent years the number of fatal highway crashes involving drunk driv-
ers has been on the increase.3 In 1975 the General Assembly of Virginia
enacted legislation which provided for the creation of the Virginia Alcohol
Safety Action Program (VASAP),' a novel rehabilitative approach to the
drunk driver problem. The legislation authorizing VASAP did not affect
the availability of the more traditional penalties for drunk drivers; sent-
encing judges still are empowered to impose fines, jail sentences and sus-
pend driver's licenses.5 VASAP gives Virginia judges the opportunity to
offer education and treatment to the "driving while intoxicated" (DWI)
defendant as an alternative to punitive sentencing. Although the VASAP
I One to four per cent of the drivers on the road, those with blood alcohol concentrations
(BAC) at or above 0.10%, account for about 50% of all single vehicle crashes in which drivers
are fatally injured. See note 6 infra. U.S. DEPT. OF TRANsP., ALCOHOL Am HIGHWAY SAFETY, A
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FROM THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION (Aug. 1968), reproduced in
B. FREEMAN, DRUNK DRvNG CASEs: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE, at 157-59 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY]. The use of alcohol by drivers and pedestrians leads
to some 25,000 deaths and a total of at least 800,000 highway crashes in the United States
each year. Id. at 5.
2 Between the years of 1960 and 1975, approximately one-third of the fatal crashes in
Virginia involved drinking drivers. Compiled from VIRGINIA STATE POLICE, VIRGINIA TRAFFIC
CRASH FACTS (1960-1976).
3 In 1973, the percentage of crashes in Virginia involving drunk drivers was 29.1%; in 1974
the figure rose to 33.6%; in 1975 the number increased to 34%; and the 1976 figure was 34.3%.
Id.
, H. 1662, 1975 VA. ACTs, codified at VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
3 See note 14 infra.
The offense of "driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated" (DWI) is defined at section
18.2-266 of the Virginia Code (Cum. Supp. 1977) which provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine, or train while under the influence
of alcohol, or while under the influence of any narcotic drug or any other self-administered
intoxicant or drug of whatsoever nature.' The degree of intoxication contemplated by the
statute does not relate to the ability of the driver to operate the automobile with safety to
himself and others, but whether or not he is actually under the influence of intoxicants at
the time he is driving the automobile. Spickard v. City of Lynchburg, 174 Va. 502, 504-05, 6'
S.E.2d 610, 611 (1940); Owens v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 624, 629, 136 S.E. 765, 767 (1927).
Recently, the evidence used to show the influence of intoxicating liquors on the DWI
offender has been obtained through the implementation of the "blood alcohol concentration"
(BAC) concept. The state's implied consent statute, VA. CODE § 18.2-268(b) (Repl. Vol. 1975),
provides that as a condition to the operation of a motor vehicle in the state, a driver arrested
for a DWI offense has consented to have a sample of his blood or breath taken to determine
the BAC level of his blood. The statute does not violate a defendant's right against self-
674 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
program appears to be able to withstand a challenge on constitutional
grounds,7 the wide range of discretion given to the trial judges8 by the state
legislature does raise possible due process' and equal protection'" problems.
In order to help alleviate these problems, the authorizing legislation should
be amended to standardize the procedure used by the judges in granting
VASAP to all DWI defendants and to require the judges to offer VASAP
to all first-time DWI offenders in Virginia." These changes might help
VASAP reach its stated goal of reducing alcohol-related automobile acci-
dents on Virginia's highways.'"
The relationship of alcohol to vehicular death and injury has long been
recognized as a serious health and social problem." While the Code of
Virginia embodies the traditional punitive approaches for dealing with
drunk drivers," the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the purpose
incrimination guaranteed by Art. I, § 8 of the Virginia Constitution and the fifth and four-
teenth amendments of the federal Constitution. Shumate v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 877, 153
S.E.2d 243 (1967). In Schmerber v. California, 348 U.S. 757 (1966), the Supreme Court ruled
that the police were not required to obtain a warrant under the Fourth Amendment before
"searching" a DWI defendant's blood. Id., at 770-71.
The BAC level as found by chemical analysis of the accused's blood or breath gives rise
to three possible classifications under Virginia law. If there is a 0.05 per cent or less volume
of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it is presumed that the defendant was not under the
influence of alcohol. VA. CODE § 18.2-269(1) (Repl. Vol. 1975). If the chemical analysis reveals
a percentage in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than 0.10 per cent of alcohol in the blood, the
BAC level does not give rise to any presumption that the defendant was under the influence
of alcohol, but the test results may be considered with other evidence in determining the
accused's guilt or innocence. Id. at § 18.2-269(2). Finally, if there is 0.10 per cent or more of
alcohol in the blood, it is presumed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.
Id. at § 18.2-269(3).
7 The Virginia Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of VASAP or
its authorizing statute, section 18.2-271.1 of the Virginia Code.
See text accompanying notes 41-51 infra.
See text accompanying notes 72-91 infra.
10 See text accompanying notes 92-157 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 158-172 infra.
2 See text accompanying notes 26-27 infra.
13 In 1904, five years after the first motor vehicle crash in the United States, scientific
literature already recognized alcohol as a serious social and health problem for the growing
number of the nation's drivers. Editorial, 26 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF INEBRIETY 308, 308-
09 (1904), cited in ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 157.
" Virginia's first statute dealing with penalties for driving while under the influence of
alcohol became effective with the passage of H. 387,1916 VA. AcTS. The statute provided that
"it shall be unlawful for any chauffeur, motorman, engineer, or other person to drive or run
any automobile, car, truck, engine, or train while under the influence of intoxicants." VA.
CODE § 4722 (1916). The statute set as a penalty a fine of not less than five dollars nor more
than one hundred, or confinement in jail for not less than thirty days, nor more than ninety
days, or both. Id.
The present statutory penalties for drunk driving provide that any person found guilty
of DWI is considered guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-270, 18.2-271 (Repl.
Vol. 1975). This results in "confinement in jail for not more than six months and a fine of
not more than five hundred dollars, either or both." VA. CODE § 18.2-11(b) (Repl. Vol. 1975).
In addition, under Virginia Code Section 18.2-271 (Repl. Vol. 1975), the convicted DWI
offender will suffer a forfeiture of his driver's license for a period of not less than six months
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of even those statutes is not only to punish drunk drivers, but also to
prevent such drivers from using the highways."
The improvement of public safety should be the most important goal
of any program meant to deter the drunk driver." The advantage gained
by the suspension of drivers' licenses, however, is only a temporary solu-
tion. Six months after conviction, the first-time DWI offender in Virginia
may be allowed to resume driving.17 Moreover, an appreciable percentage
of those drivers whose licenses have been suspended or revoked for DWI
offenses continue to drive. 8 More importantly, the premise of the argu-
ment for the enforcement of the traditional punitive sanctions has been
effectively destroyed.' Research has shown that it is not the large number
of social drinkers who cause the automobile collision problem.2' The tradi-
tional punitive approach has failed because of its inability to reach the core
of the problem-the disease of alcoholism.2' Several studies have indicated
that rather than the social drinker, it is the pathological drinker who
accounts for the majority of alcohol-related accidents.2
Based on the results of the federal Alcohol Safety Action Projects
(ASAP),n VASAP presents a new approach which attempts to deal with
the DWI offender's individual drinking problems through education and
treatment commensurate with the level of the individual's problem. 24 The
fundamental premise of the program is that the inflexible penalties of
traditional legal sanctions do not succeed in "scaring" the problem out of
the alcoholic driver.2 VASAP offers the DWI offender individualized reha-
and no more than a year. The penalties become more severe for subsequent offenses, ranging
from a fine of not less than two hundred dollars and no more than one thousand dollars to
confinement in jail for a period of one month to one year, coupled with a loss of driver's license
as may be determined by the court. Id.
" Commonwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 415, 4 S.E.2d 762, 767 (1939).
,J. FINCH & J. SmrrH, PsYcmATRIc AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF AUTOMOBLE FATALrIIES, 83
(1970) [hereinafter cited as FINCH & SMITH].
'" VA. CODE § 18.2-271 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
"ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 7.
" See note 21 infra.
' FINcH & SMrrH, supra note 16, at 83.
In 1964, a study based on extensive research concerning drinking drivers in California
concluded that the typical drinking driver involved in an automobile crash "usually is not
an ordinary individual who is unlucky in getting into trouble, but rather is a socially deviant
person (often a chronic alcoholic)." FINcH & SMrTH, supra note 16, at 14. Known as the
"Waller hypothesis," this study suggests that traditional approaches to alcohol usage and
safety on the highways be reexamined closely for possible changes. Id.
" See, e.g., Brenner, Alcoholism and Fatal Accidents, 28 Q.J. STUDIES OF ALCOHOL 305,
505-16 (Sept. 1967); Seizer, Payne, Gifford, & Kelly, Alcoholism, Mental Illness, and the
Drunk Driver, 120 AM. J. PSYCH. 326 (1963); Selzer, Automobil Accidents and the Alcoholic
Personality: An Unrecognized Dilemma, 39 MicH. ST. B.J. 12 (1960); ALCOHOL AND HIGHWAY
SAFETY, supra note 1, at 5. See also, Comment, The Drinking Driver: An Approach to Solving
a Problem of Underestimated Severity, 14 VILL. L. REv. 97, 109 (1968).
= See text accompanying notes 34-39 infra.
24 HIGHWAY SAFETY DIVISION OF VIRGINIA, THE FIRST VASAP ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as FIRsT VASAP REPORTI.
2 See, HIGHWAY SAFETY DvsION OF V GmiA, THE SECOND VASAP ANNUAL REPoRT 1
1978]
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bilitation through local alcohol safety action programs which vary with the
specific needs and characteristics of the particular locality." The funda-
mental goal of VASAP is to improve highway safety by reducing the deaths
and injuries related to alcohol and driving.Y The primary goal is to be
achieved through two sub-goals: the reduction in blood alcohol concentra-
tion levels of drinkers using the roads, and the reduction in the recidivism
of drivers arrested for alcohol-related offenses.2 Because of the short exist-
ence of the program29 and the haphazard development of local alcohol
safety programs across Virginia,3" the available crash data are not helpful
in measuring VASAP's success in attaining these goals." Moreover, a re-
searcher of federal ASAPs has stated that it may take ten years before
ASAP will cause a decline in the number of lives lost and of drivers who
are drinking.32 Although VASAP does not guarantee an immediate reduc-
tion in lives lost on the road, the program at the very least reaches the
individual DWI offender who has the benefit of the educational process
before his driving privileges are restored.
The educational-rehabilitative approach to the drunk driving problem
began in January 1972, when the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration of the U.S. Department of Transportation established thirty-five
model ASAPs throughout the country. 4 Fairfax County, Virginia was
awarded one such model program." The administrators of the Fairfax
program concentrated their attack on the drunk driver problem in the
areas of police enforcement, public information, the courts and rehabilita-
tion. 6 Extensive statistical studies of the Fairfax program demonstrated
(1977) [hereinafter cited as SECOND VASAP REPORT].
26 FIRST VASAP REPoar, supra note 24, at 9.
SSECOND VASAP REPORT, supra note 25, at 25. For a thorough discussion of the goals
and purposes of VASAP, see B. LANDSTREr, THE DmNKING DRvIER (1977).
2 SECOND VASAP REPORT, supra note 24, at 9.
" See note 40 infra.
20 See note 95 infra.
1, But see the favorable results of studies of a model program in Fairfax County, Virginia
at note 37, infra.
32 Scrimgeour, Has ASAP Failed? 75 TRAFFIC SAFETY 16, 18 (Feb. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Scrimgeour]. One commentator has noted that since ASAP is a series of local projects,
the success of the program depends entirely upon what each community wants and will do.
Id. at 17.
33 One Virginia General District Judge found VASAP to be a success because of the fact
that the structure of the program insures that when the DWI offender is allowed to drive again
he has at least some knowledge of the dangers that his use of alcohol may cause; whereas
under the traditional punitive sanction, an offender learned nothing while his driver's license
was suspended for six months. Interview with The Honorable Joseph E. Hess, Judge, Twenty-
fifth Judicial District, in Buena Vista, Virginia (September 1, 1977).
3, Funds for the thirty-five model programs were authorized by the Highway Safety Act
of 1966, 23 U.S.C. § 403 (1966).
3 The Transportation Department allocated $2.1 million to the Virginia Highway Safety
Division for the implementation of the Fairfax project. Ferguson & Smith, The Second Year
Evaluation Summary of the Total Project Impact of the Fairfax Alcohol Safety Action
Project, 31 HIGHWAY AND TRANSP. RESEARCH COUNCIL REP. 587, 589 (1973-74).
B. KimBLE, A CosT-BEFrr FRAMEWORK FOR THE FAiRFAX ASAP 3 (Aug. 1972) (unpub-
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its success in reducing fatalities, injuries and property damage, 3 and in
increasing public awareness of the drinking and driving problem." Further
studies revealed that the recidivism rate was higher for those persons who
did not choose to enter the program than for ASAP participants.39 The
Virginia General Assembly, convinced of the success of the Fairfax pro-
gram, enacted section 18.2-271.1 of the Virginia Code,4" thereby making it
possible for trial judges throughout the state to offer this rehabilitative
approach to DWI defendants.
The VASAP-authorizing statute gives Virginia General District and
Circuit Court judges the power to plea bargain with the DWI defendant."
lished thesis in Alderman Library, University of Virginia). See text accompanying notes 52-
56 infra.
17 Spencer & Ferguson, An Analysis of Ultimate Performance Measures to Determine
Total Project Impact of the Fairfax ASAP, 32 HIGHWAY AND TRANSP. RESEARCH CouNcIL. REP.
1637 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Spencer & Ferguson].
In its report to the state legislature, the Virginia Highway Safety Division stated that
extensive evaluations of the Fairfax ASAP unquestionably demonstrated its effectiveness as
one of the most successful of the federally sponsored programs in combatting the drunk
driver problem. SECOND VASAP REPORT, supra note 25, at 2. However, there are competing
considerations which suggest that the Fairfax program was not the unqualified success which
the Highway Safety Division claimed. Although during the program period there was a
definite reduction in the number of highway fatalities in Fairfax County based on trends
established over fifteen prior years, two factors diminish the significance of this finding.
First, in 1971, the Fairfax area experienced an abnormally large number of fatal crashes.
Spencer & Ferguson, supra at 1641-42. Therefore, the decreasing numbers in 1972 and 1973
may have reflected a return to normal. The second factor was the effect of the energy short-
age on highway statistics during 1973-74. The fact that fewer people used the highways
due to the scarcity of automobile fuels,'and the imposition of a nationwide 55 mph speed limit
definitely contributed to the decline in highway fatalities. Id. See Scrimgeour, supra note 32,
at 18.
u Jordan, A Comparison of Household Surveys of the Fairfax ASAP, 31 HIGHWAY AND
TRASNP. RESEARCH CouNcIL REP. 1009 (1974); Smith, Trends in Driving at Night, 31 HIGHWAY
AND TRA~sp. REsEARCH CouNcm RE'. 3165 (1974).
11 Lynn, Final Report-Diagnosis, Referral, and Rehabilitation Within the Fairfax
ASAP, 32 HIGHWAY AND TRANSP. RESEARCH CouNciL REP. 1849 (1974).
,o The Virginia Alcohol Safety Action Program came into existence with the General
Assembly's approval of H. 1662 on March 24, 1975 in which § 18.2-271.1 was added to the
Code of Virginia. The bill was designated "emergency legislation," and thus took effect
immediately after passage. H. 1662, 1975 VA. AcTs. The bill authorized the Virginia Highway
Safety Division or any community to establish alcohol safety action programs. VA. CODE §
18.2-271.1(d) (Repl. Vol. 1975). Before the legislature passed H. 1662, Fairfax, Alexandria,
Arlington, and Winchester had organized operational ASAP-type programs. SECOND VASAP
REPoirr, supra note 25, at 2. Since these programs were not sanctioned by law, the judges who
referred DWI defendants to the programs before March 24, 1975 were doing so without the
approval of the legislature.
" It is not the intent of § 18.2-271.1 that the defendant be ionvicted before entering the
program. Letter from the Attorney General of Virginia, Andrew P. Miller, to the Honorable
Duncan C. Gibb, Judge, Twenty-sixth Judicial Circuit (Oct. 16, 1975). The language in
paragraph (a) of the statute authorizes a "continuance" for a period of up to one year, during
which the defendant is placed on probation, and under paragraph (b) the court is authorized
to accept compliance with the probation terms "in lieu of a conviction." VA. CODE § 18.2-
271.1(a) & (b) (Repl. Vol. 1975). Further, under § 18.2-271 any DWI conviction operates to
deprive the convicted person of the right to drive. Such a deprivation would not be consistent
1978]
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In return for the defendant's payment of not more than a $200 fee, 2 his
promise to attend VASAP meetings, and other conditions, 3 the court may
grant" the defendant probation for a period not to exceed one year, 5 and
give the defendant the opportunity to reduce his DWI charge to a lesser
offense upon successful completion of the program. 6 The most significant
feature of the statute is the wide range of discretion given the trial judge
by the state legislature. The statute empowers the judge to make virtually
all the decisions relating to the defendant's participation in VASAP in-
cluding: the use of the program as an option to imposing criminal sanc-
tions; 7 the eligibility of a particular defendant for the program;"8 the spe-
cific driver alcohol rehabilitation program to which the defendant will be
assigned;49 the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation;" and,
with the thrust of § 18.2-271.1 which permits the court to accept compliance with the proba-
tion order "in lieu of a conviction." Id.
42 H. 1662, as passed in 1975, set the maximum VASAP fee at $150 and required the fee
to be forwarded to the Highway Safety Division for implementation of the statewide program.
H. 1662, 1975 VA. AcTs, codified at VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(a)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1975). On April
10, 1976, the General Assembly passed H. 1210, amending parts of the authorizing statute.
The amendment raised the maximum fee to $200 dollars and allowed local jurisdictions to
retain almost all of the monies paid by VASAP participants. Localities now forward only $20
of the participant's fee to the Highway Safety Division. H. 1210, 1976 VA. ACTS, codified at
VA. CODE 18.2-271.1(al) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
11 See note 50 infra.
" H. Bill 1210, 1976 VA. AcTs, amending parts of § 18.2-271.1, eliminated the previous
requirement that the defendant expressly request VASAP. The trial judge is now allowed to
suggest on his own motion that the DWI defendant be placed in VASAP. VA. CODE § 18.2-
271.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(a) (Repl. Vol. 1975).
" See text accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
'T Section 18.2-271.1(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977) states that "[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to prevent the exercise by a court of its authority to make any lawful disposition
of a charge of a violation of § 18.2-266. . . ." Given the wide discretion which trial judges
possess in making VASAP decisions, the authors attempted to solicit the personal opinions
of the judges regarding various aspects of the program. Towards this end a survey was sent
during October of 1977 to all 102 General District Judges in Virginia. The judges were asked
sixteen questions covering general areas such as the criteria used for determining eligibility,
the terms and conditions of a VASAP participant's probation, and the overall success of the
program. Answers were taken anonymously in order to insure statistical reliability. Fifty
judges responded to the survey, but only forty-six of these responses were used for analysis,
since four judges replied that their courts were of civil jurisdiction only. Of the forty-six judges
who have dealt with DWI cases, forty (86.9%) answered that they use the VASAP option as
codified in Virginia Code section 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) [Information extracted from
the results of the survey will be noted hereinafter as VASAP Survey].
" VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). See note 136 infra.
41 VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
-1 Id. Of the forty judges answering the survey, see note 47 supra, who use VASAP in
their courts, 60% said they required the DWI defendant to sign a form stating the terms and
conditions of his probation before allowing him to enter the program. The most prevalent of
the conditions which the judges require are attendance in VASAP classes and compliance
with the various requirements to be imposed by the local VASAP administrators (both men-
tioned by 42.5% of the judges who used the program). Also mentioned as prerequisites to
entering the program were payment of fees (35%), prompt enrollment (15%), no drinking
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within limits, the VASAP fee which the defendant will be required to pay."
The General Assembly2 and the Highway Safety Division53 relied upon
the Fairfax ASAP's successful efforts in the courts and in the rehabilitation
process in enacting the authorizing legislation and implementing the
VASAP program. The Division has sought, as part of VASAP, to improve
police enforcement of DWI laws" and to increase the amount of informa-
tion the public receives about the drunk driver problem." More important,
however, are the innovative attempts of VASAP in the courts and in the
rehabilitation process to achieve more successful statewide results in deal-
ing with the accused DWI offender."
before VASAP classes (7.5%), no driving except to and from VASAP classes (7.5%), and
complete suspension of the participant's driver's license until completion of the program
(5%). One judge required the VASAP participant to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
VASAP Survey, supra note 47.
" VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(al) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The statute sets the maximum fee for
VASAP participation at $200. See note 42, supra. According to the VASAP Survey, supra note
47, 57.5% of the judges using the program always require the payment of $200. Only 27.5%
reported that they take into account the DWI defendant's financial ability to pay before
assessing the fee. The prevailing notion seems to be that "if they can afford to drink and drive,
they can afford to pay $200 for rehabilitation." VASAP Survey, supra note 47.
52 See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.
"' SECOND VASAP REPORT, supra note 25, at 2.
1 VASAP administrators encourage local communities to increase the number of DWI
arrests in order to place more drunk drivers before the courts, giving them the opportunity
for rehabilitation in VASAP. SECOND VASAP REPORT, supra note 25, at 63. The Highway
Safety Division conducts training courses throughout the state for police officers, with empha-
sis on the detection and apprehension of drunk drivers. Id. at 6.
-" The Highway Safety Division is increasing the publicity of the dangers posed by drunk
drivers through use of the newspaper and broadcast media and various civic groups. Id. at
45-47.
11 Because of the wide discretion given the trial judges in § 18.2-271.1, the Virginia courts
have not felt compelled to adopt a uniform approach in implementing VASAP. VASAP
Survey, supra note 47. The following description of VASAP court procedure is a summary of
a model suggested by the Central Shenandoah Planning Commission in its study of the
feasibility of a VASAP program in five counties in western central Virginia. The study was
initiated in August, 1975 with the aid of a grant from the Virginia Highway Safety Division.
CENTRAL SHENANDOAH PLANIrNG DisTiucr CoMMIssIoN, ALCOHOL SAFETY ACTION PROGRAM FEA-
siBiLrrY STuDY 103 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FEAsmmrrY STUDY].
When a defendant charged with drunk driving appears for trial, the court reviews his
record and makes a final determination as to the defendant's eligibility to enter the VASAP
program. Judges are permitted to use a wide range of criteria in deciding a DWI defendant's
"eligibility" for VASAP, including such factors as the distance of the defendant's residence
from the VASAP facility, the defendant's willingness to agree to the terms of the probation,
and whether the defendant was a DWI recidivist who had already completed a VASAP
program in connection with an earlier offense. Id. See Jordan, An Analysis of Problem Drink-
ing Diagnosis and Referral in the Fairfax ASAP, 31 VIRGINiA HMGHWAY AND TRANSP. RESEARCH
COUNCIL REP. 1460 (1974-75). See text accompanying notes 135-42 infra, for issues raised by
the Virginia judges' use of a wide range of criteria in determining eligibility for VASAP.
If the court determines that the defendant is not eligible for VASAP, or if the defendant
turns down the court's offer of the program, the court tries the defendant on the DWI charge.
FEAsmirrY STUDY, supra at 103. Under sections 18.2-270 and 18.2-271 of the Virginia Code, a
first-time DWI offender could be fined not more than $500, confined in jail for not more than
six months, and could lose his operator's license for not less than six months, and not more
19781 VASAP
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VASAP adopted the approach of the Fairfax model program in classify-
ing DWI referrals for rehabilitation.57 "Social drinkers" are placed in a
level one curriculum which acknowledges that the participant's principal
problem is not drinking, per se, but the fact that he does not realize the
dangers caused when he drives after having had too much to drink." The
sixteen-hour level one course combines defensive driving instruction with
elementary alcohol education, and is often administered at a local high
school." Since level one drinkers use alcohol with moderation, VASAP uses
a purely educational approach; 0 there are no group encounter sessions.
While the level one instructor undoubtedly succeeds in imparting informa-
tion about defensive driving and alcohol's effect on driving,"' a criticism
of the curriculum is that it ignores the basic premise that the alcoholic is
the cause of almost all of the DWI-related fatalities.
2
"Pre-problem drinkers" or potential problem drinkers are classified by
VASAP as those individuals who are past the social drinking level, but do
than one year. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-270, 18.2-271 (Repl. Vol. 1975). See notes 14-15 supra.
If the defendant is eligible for the program, the court may order probation, either upon
the defendant's or the court's own motion, on the condition that the defendant promise to
attend a driver education program or an alcohol treatment program or both. If the defendant
agrees to participate in the program offered, he is usually required to sign an agreement
stating the terms of his probation. See note 50 supra. Upon the defendant's payment of a fee
not to exceed $200, his trial is continued for a period of up to one year. VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1
(Repl. Vol. 1975).
The agreement which the defendant signs usually requires him to report to the local
VASAP center for initial classification and scheduling of classes. The VASAP administrators
keep the court informed of the defendant's progress in the program with at least a mid-term
report and a final report. Of the judges who use the VASAP option in their courts, however,
27.5% reported they receive no notification of a defendant's progress until he has either
satisfactorily completed the program or violated the terms of his probation. VASAP Survey,
supra note 47. If the trial judge is informed by the program's officials that a defendant is not
acting in compliance with the terms of his probation, the judge may revoke the probation,
and proceed to find the defendant guilty of the original charge of DWI. FEAsmLrry STUDY,
supra at 103. See text accompanying notes 70-91, infra.
I The VASAP participant's initial interview with his case manager is a critical point in
the classification process of the program. The interview and the defendant's past record serve
to give the case manager the information needed to direct the defendant into one of three
VASAP curricula according to his level of drinking pattern: social drinker, potential or pre-
problem drinker, or alcoholic. FEASIBIUTY STUDY, supra note 56, at 106-07. See text accom-
panying notes 58-67 infra.
FEASiBiLrrY STUDY, supra note 56 at 108.
59 Id.
so Id.
Id. at Appendix E.
02 Interview with Major Thomas Sawyer, Chairman, Alcohol Services of Rockbridge
County, in Lexington, Virginia (October 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sawyer Interview].
Many local VASAPs refuse to offer a level one curriculum, thereby treating all DWI defen-
dants as if they had an alcohol problem. Id. The Highway Safety Division's recommendation
of level one rehabilitation does acknowledge that there is a substantial number of drunk
drivers who do not need to be treated for alcoholic problems, thereby modifying the Waller
hypothesis. See note 21 supra.
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not show signs of alcoholic addiction or serious problem drinking."3 These
drinkers are placed into a level two curriculum at a local community col-
lege where the emphasis is directed at the drinkers' heavy alcohol abuses.
Through education and confrontation with other participants, VASAP's
goal in the level two curriculum is to increase self-awareness of the individ-
uals' drinking habits and to promote a change in their attitudes toward
alcohol."
VASAP recommends no set curriculum for dealing with alcoholics, who
are placed into level three. These are individuals who need professional
alcohol counseling." Since the local programs are not designed to treat
alcoholics, those individuals are referred directly to community alcohol
agencies. Most of these agencies utilize lectures, discussions, group and
individual psychotherapy, and physical therapy in an effort to convince
the participant to overcome his dependence upon alcohol. 8 Since an ex-
tended length of time may be necessary for level three treatment, the
alcoholic defendant may be required to provide funds beyond the initial
$200 fee."7
After the VASAP participant has completed his scheduled curriculum,
the local VASAP staff evaluates his progress and determines whether any
further rehabilitation is needed. If the participant has satisfied the staff
with his progress in the course, a final report is prepared for the trial judge,
and the defendant is returned to court for the final disposition of his case.68
13 FEAsmrry STUDY, supra note 56, at 109. Section 18.2-271.1 of the Virginia Code gives
local communities almost complete control over the local alcohol referral programs. Many
programs in the state, therefore, do not adhere to the curricula suggested by the Virginia
Highway Safety Division. The VASAP model proposed by the Central Shenandoah Planning
Commission has never been adopted. See note 56 supra. However, two of the localities within
the planning commission's district, Lexington/Buena Vista and Harrisonburg, have their own
programs which serve the local courts. Both the Pear Street Center in Harrisonburg and
Alcohol Services of Rockbridge County (ASOR) in Lexington offer only level two curriculums.
Unlike the VASAPs administered by the Highway Safety Division, the ASOR program fo-
cuses entirely on the defendant's alcohol problems, rather than attempting to cure the defen-
dant's driving inabilities through a level one curriculum. ASOR is funded in part by a grant
from the Virginia Department of Retardation. Sawyer Interview, supra note 62.
11 FEAsUi1LrrY STUDY, supra note 56, at 109. At least one local program has initiated the
use of another curriculum which serves as a middle ground between levels two and three. The
defendants placed in this curriculum are given an extended period of level two treatment,
but are usually not referred to community alcohol agencies. Telephone Interview with Mr.
Lee Hall, Director, Pear Street Center, Harrisonburg, Virginia (October 11, 1977).
63 FEASIBILrrY STUDY, supra note 56, at 110.
68 Id.
VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(al) (Cum. Supp. 1977), provides the authority for the initial $200
charge. See note 42 supra. In addition, the statute states that "such fees as may reasonably
be required of defendants referred for extended treatment under such program may be
charged." Id. Thirty-five per cent of the judges who use the program said that they do not
warn VASAP participants that additional fees may be charged. VASAP Survey, supra note
47.
a FEASmILITY STUDY, supra note 56, at 114. In 1977 a Newport News General District
Judge asked the Attorney General for an opinion concerning liability of VASAP employees
for negligence in the performance of their duties. The Attorney General answered that the
1978] VASAP
682 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
The judge then determines whether the defendant has complied with the
probation order." Such compliance may be accepted by the court in lieu
of a conviction of DWI,7" or the court may amend the arrest warrant and
find the defendant guilty of other lesser violations of the traffic laws.7'
A VASAP participant's status in the program may be terminated be-
fore he successfully completes the program because of his failure to comply
with the conditions of his probation.2 The majority of the General District
Court judges who use the VASAP program have not indicated whether
they give a disobedient VASAP participant an opportunity to explain his
actions before revoking the defendant's probation and trying the original
charge of DWI.7" This is one of several instances where the wide range of
VASAP employees probably could not be held liable for damages caused by a drunk driver
who had successfully completed the program. Letter from Attorney General Anthony F. Troy
to the Honorable John H. Harvell I (July 11, 1977). Public officers generally are held liable
only for their tortious ministerial acts. 4 McQuiLLAN, MUmICIPAL CoRPOA IoNs, § 12.211 (1968
Rev. Vol.). A ministerial duty is one in which nothing is left to discretion-a simple, definite
duty, imposed by law. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1148 (4th ed. 1951). In Wynn v. Gandy, 197
S.E. 527, 170 Va. 590 (1938), the court held that a school bus driver performing ministerial
duties could be held personally liable for injuries to a student resulting from the driver's
negligent operation of the bus. Id. at 595, 197 S.E. at 529. However, in Lawhorne v. Harlan,
200 S.E.2d 569, 214 Va. 405 (1973), the court recognized the discretionary duties of the
defendants, ruling that the cloak of sovereign immunity protected the administrators of the
University of Virginia hospital in a wrongful death action which alleged negligence in the
diagnosis and treatment of a patient's illness. Id. at 407, 200 S.E.2d at 572. The local members
of the VASAP staff use their own judgment and discretion in making the decision of whether
to send a participant's case back to court upon completion of the course. See text accompany-
ing note 68. Employees performing activities which require judgment and discretion are not
liable to private suit for acts done in the performance of their duties. 4 McQUILLAN, MUNIcIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 12.208 (1968 Rev. Vol.).
Local governments which oversee local VASAPs would probably not be held liable for
unintentional torts which resulted from the performance of VASAP services. Letter from
Attorney General Anthont F. Troy to the Honorable Jones H. Harvell III (July 11, 1977). The
test to be applied was announced in Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 125 S.E.2d 808, 812; 203 Va.
551, 556 (1962), quoting Bolster v. City of Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722 (1917), as
"... whether the act is for the common good of all without the element of special corporate
benefit, or pecuniary profit. If it is, there is no liability, if it is not, there may be liability."
6' FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 56, at 114.
70 VA. CODE § 18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
7, Twenty-five percent of the General District Court Judges who said they use the
VASAP option responded that dismissal of the DWI charge is the result of the VASAP
participant's successful completion of the program. VASAP Survey, supra note 47. Thirty per
cent replied that upon successful completion, the defendant's charge is reduced to reckless
driving. Id. One judge mentioned that the charge could be reduced. to improper driving. Id.
Several judges also mentioned that upon a defendant's successful completion of VASAP, he
still could be found guilty of DWI. Id. However, a finding of guilt after successful completion
of the program would not be consistent with the provisions of § 18.2-271.1(b) which call for
the court's acceptance of defendant's compliance with the probation order "in lieu of convic-
tion." Letter from Attorney General Andrew P. Miller to the Honorable J. B. Kingsbury, I,
Judge, Southampton County General District Court (Jan. 7, 1976).
72 FEASIBILrrY STUDY, supra note 56, at 112. VASAP Survey, supra note 47.
'3 Thirty per cent of the judges said they required the defendant to plead guilty before
allowing them to enter the program. This prerequisite imposed by some judges insures that
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discretion given trial judges by the VASAP-authorizing legislation74 leads
to a disparity of procedures used in making VASAP-related decisions. 5
Due process requirements appear to dictate that the procedures used by
judges in making all VASAP decisions be standardized in order to relieve
the disparity. Since the defendant is gianted "probation"7 when he is
permitted to enter VASAP, the Supreme Court case of Gagnon v.
Scarpelli's would seem to require that all disobedient VASAP participants
be given the due process right to a hearing before their probation is re-
voked. 9
In Gagnon, a criminal defendant had received a suspended sentence
and was placed on probation for seven years." Two months later the Wis-
consin Department of Public Welfare revoked the probation without a
the defendants who allegedly have violated the terms of the probation are automatically
found guilty of DWI. The plea of guilty is merely accepted, thereby eliminating the require-
ment of a hearing as to the defendant's reasons for violating his probation. VASAP Survey,
supra note 47. See note 88 infra.
The judicial practice of requiring a DWI defendant to file a guilty plea before permitting
him to enter VASAP may be contrary to the ruling of United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968). In Jackson, the Supreme Court ruled that a provision of the federal kidnapping act,
which provided for the death penalty for convicted interstate kidnappers "if the verdict of
the jury shall so recommend," was upconstitutional. Id. at 571. The Court found the effect
of the statute was to discourage the assertion of the fifth amendment right not to plead guilty.
Id. at 581. The Court ruled that "whatever the power of Congress to impose a death penalty
for violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act, Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a
manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right." Id. at 583. Relying
on Jackson, it may be argued that although the General Assembly may authorize the judge
to revoke a DWI offender's right to drive upon conviction, the judge may not dissuade the
defendant from his decision to plead not guilty by eliminating the opportunity to enter
VASAP upon conviction after a plea of not guilty.
Nevertheless, subsequent cases have limited Jackson to its facts. In Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court ruled that Jackson did not set up a new standard for
judging the validity of guilty pleas. Brady reiterated ihe test that guilty pleas are valid if
voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 747. In Chaffin v. Stynchrombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court
said that "Jackson did not hold that the Constitution forbids every government-imposed
choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional
rights." Id. at 29. See North Carolina v. Afford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The requirement of a
guilty plea imposed by 30% of the General District Judges in VASAP plea bargaining can be
sustained by the following test:
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including
the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats, . . . misrepresentations, . . . or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relation-
ship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)."
Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir., 1957) (Tuttle, J., dissenting), rev'd on
rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir., 1958).
11 See VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
71 See notes 47, 50, 51, 56, 71, & 73 supra.
71 See text accompanying notes 163-69 infra.
" VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
79 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
7' U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
411 U.S. at 780.
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hearing after the defendant was arrested for burglary in Illinois, and the
defendant immediately began serving his fifteen year sentence for the orig-
inal crime.' In granting the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, the Supreme Court relied on Morrissey v. Brewer 2 and the similarities
between the characteristics of probation and parole. The Morrissey court
held that the liberty of a parolee included enough of "the core values of
unqualified liberty" to call for some type of "orderly process, however
informal," before that liberty can be revoked. 3 Before a probationer's pro-
bation could be rescinded, Morrissey held that due process demands that
he have a personal hearing before a neutral body where he could present
witnesses and evidence and confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. 4 In Gagnon, the Court recognized that probation revocation also
results in a loss of liberty, and ruled that a probationer, like a parolee, is
entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing under the condi-
tions specified in Morrissey.8"
The probation that a DWI defendant receives can be distinguished
from the probation referred to in Gagnon. In Gagnon, the defendant re-
ceived probation after being convicted of a crime, whereas, ordinarily, the
VASAP participant is not found guilty before being given probation. In
Gagnon, the defendant was given a suspended sentence, while a VASAP
participant's trial is usually continued and there is no finding of guilt.8
Thus, unlike the defendant in Gagnon, the revocation of a VASAP partici-
pant's probation does not result in an immediate loss of liberty, since the
VASAP probationer retains the chance to defend himself on the DWI
charge before an impartial tribunal.
Despite the differences from the probation in Gagnon, the termination
of a VASAP participant's probation remains a crucial point in the prosecu-
tion of the DWI defendant, since the decision to revoke the probation
involves the reactivation of prosecution with the possibility of a depriva-
tion of liberty by conviction and imprisonment.88 In addition, the recent
trend in Supreme Court decisions" indicates that the VASAP participant
UId.
' 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
"Id. at 482.
Id. at 489.
411 U.S. at 782.
" See note 41 supra.
"Id.
" But see note 73 supra. If the VASAP probationer had been required to plead guilty
before being permitted to enter the program, he would immediately suffer a loss of liberty
when his guilty plea is accepted. Gagnon would seem to require that he receive the due
process rights detailed in Morrissey before the trial court can accept the guilty plea. See text
accompanying note 85 supra.
" See 411 U.S. at 785.
10 Cf., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (student's expulsion or suspension from a
public school without a hearing violates due process); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(revocation of defendant's probation without a hearing violates due process); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (public educational institution must give a college instructor a
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whose probation status is threatened should be entitled at least to some
of the protections outlined in Morrissey. Due process limitations would
appear to require at a minimum that he be accorded the right to notice,
an opportunity to present his views, the right to controvert evidence, and
the right to a written statement of findings before the court can proceed
to try the DWI charge."
In addition to the issue of due process, the VASAP program also raises
possible constitutional problems of equal protection.2 At the present time
there are several areas in Virginia where either no alcohol safety action
program exists93 or a program separate from-VASAP is in operation. 4 Al-
though the goal of the Highway Safety Division is the implementation of
a statewide alcohol safety program, total coverage of the Commonwealth
has not yet been achieved." Therefore, DWI offenders in some areas of the
state do not have the opportunity to choose the VASAP option solely
because they do not live in an area where the program is offered. This
hearing before terminating his employment); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (defen-
dant's parole cannot be revoked without giving him opportunity to be heard); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971) (uninsured motorist's driver's license cannot be suspended before trial
without a consideration of fault at pre-trial hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(termination of welfare benefits without notice and hearing violates due process).
" Before the status of a pre-trial intervention program participant can be terminated,
he is entitled to several procedural rights including the right to notice, to an impartial
tribunal, to an opportunity to present his views, to controvert evidence, and to a written
statement of findings. Skoler, Protecting the Rights of Defendants in Pre-trial Intervention
Programs, 10 CRmi. L. BULL. 473, 485 (1974). Pretrial intervention programs are similar to
VASAP. The former calls for ceasing the prosecution of the cases of less serious first felony
offenders after arrest and prior to arraignment. If the offender responds favorably to rehabili-
tation for a measurable period, the court and prosecutor are asked to approve dismissal of
the case prior to trial. Id. at 474.
12 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 E.g., Henrico County does not have any type of alcohol safety action program aimed
at rehabilitation of drunk drivers, nor does it plan to have one in the near future. SECOND
VASAP REPORr, supra note 25, at 5.
" E.g., Rockbridge County rejected the state-implemented VASAP plan in favor of its
own rehabilitation effort (ASOR). See note 63 supra.
Is As of January 15, 1977, approximately 86% of all licensed drivers in Virginia resided
in cities or counties that offered VASAP or some other type of alcohol safety program for DWI
offenders. SECOND VASAP REPORT, supra note 25, at 5.
16 See note 93 supra. Backlogs present a similar problem which has the same effect as
the absence of an alcohol safety program in certain areas. Some local VASAPs are in early
stages of development and are not yet operating at full capacity. It is possible that due to
the limited operation of VASAP in some areas, a DWI offender may be brought before a court
in a jurisdiction that employs the VASAP option, but because of backlogs cannot accept the
defendant into the program. Therefore, similarly situated individuals in the same county
would not receive uniform treatment. Sawyer Interview, supra note 62. This results in "under-
inclusion," which occurs when a state benefits persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate
state interest or purpose, but does not confer this same benefit on others who are similarly
situated. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1084 (1969).
Although some cases of under-inclusion may be so arbitrary as to deny equal protection,
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), courts have tolerated the concept on the rationale that
legislatures must be allowed to employ reform on a step-by-step basis. Williamson v. Lee
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presents a potential conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution which guarantees to all persons equal protection of the
laws.9" The conflict could be resolved, however, if Section 18.2-271.1 of the
Code of Virginia were revised to require trial judges to offer the VASAP
option to all first-time DWI offenders in Virginia. 8
The problem of equal protection may still arise, however, due to the
absence of an alcohol safety program in some areas of the Commonwealth.
In order for a DWI offender to challenge the VASAP statute99 on such
grounds, he must follow the approach set out in recent years by the United
States Supreme Court. In analyzing possible conflicts under the equal
protection doctrine, the Court utilizes two standards of review 9 under
which cases involving a "fundamental interest"'"' or "suspect classifica-
tion"' ' are subject to "strict scrutiny," ' 3 while all other cases are tested
by a more lenient standard of rationality.' 4 When suspect classifications
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Administrative necessity may impose limitations on
what a state can accomplish within a limited period of time. The VASAP program is less than
three years old and difficulties such as backlogs should be rectified as the size of the program
increases. One solution taken by the Rockbridge County ASOR program has been the imple-
mentation of waiting lists to insure eventual entrance into the program to all DWI offenders
who choose this option. Sawyer Interview, supra note 62. For a further discussion of the under-
inclusion concept, see Tussman and tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REv. 341, 348-51 (1949).
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" See text accompanying notes 169-72 infra.
VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
'11 The two-tiered approach employed by the Supreme Court did not fully emerge until
the 1960's with such cases as Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It was
at this time that the Court started applying a standard of strict scrutiny to such concepts as
fundamental rights and suspect classifications. See generally, Wilkinson, The Supreme
Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA.
L. Rav. 945 (1975).
I" The fundamental right concept had its origin in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. William-
son, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the Supreme Court subjected to strict scrutiny a state
statute which provided for the sterilization of habitual criminals. In holding the statute
unconstitutional, the Court perceived the right to procreation as being "fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541.
"02 The initial standard for determining the existence of a suspect classification was
outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938), in which the Court stated that a "more searching judicial inquiry" is needed when
there is curtailment of political processes that are used to protect minorities. Id. at 152-53
n.4. A modem expression of the suspect classification lists the characteristics as: (1) an
application to a discrete and insular minority; (2) stigmatization of the affected class; and
(3) an immutability of traits upon which the classification is based. See Note, A Question
of Blance: Statutory Classifications Under the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REV. 155,
161-63 (1973).
"I When the strict scrutiny type of review is applied to a particular case, the chances
are favorable that the party challenging the statute in question will prevail on grounds of
equal protection. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In recent years no
statute has passed this test in any case in which it was applied. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, THE CoNsTTrnoN OF THE UNITF STATES OF AMERiCA 1475 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
"I When the rational relationship standard has been applied, the Supreme Court has
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or certain fundamental rights are involved, government statutes affecting
such interests must be justified by a showing of a compelling interest and
by a showing on the part of the government that the distinctions under the
law are necessary to further the purpose of the statute."5 If a fundamental
interest does not apply or a suspect classification is not involved, a more
limited review of rationality is applied, wherein an act is deemed valid if
it is rationally related to a legitimate state goal. Under this limited stan-
dard of review, a statute that establishes different treatment for different
groups of persons is presumed to be constitutionally valid,' and will be
upheld if the underlying basis of the differentiation is rationally related to
the purposes of the statute.'
The State of California is presently experimenting with an alcohol
safety program similar to VASAP"5s and challenges concerning possible
violations of equal protection have been considered at the appellate level.
In Department of Motor Vehicles v. Superior Court,' a DWI offender's
license was revoked pursuant to California law.'" The conviction occurred
in San Mateo County, which was not designated as a "demonstration
county" under the statute authorizing the alcohol treatment program."'
The defendant argued that the provision limiting the eligibility for the
program to drivers convicted in one of four demonstration counties consti-
tuted a denial of equal protection."' The trial court agreed,"' but the court
of appeals reversed, holding that there was no fundamental interest in-
volved and that the limited availability of the program did not constitute
a denial of equal protection."'
The reasoning of the court in Department of Motor Vehicles is applica-
ble to the potential equal protection issue in VASAP. It does not appear
deferred almost entirely to legislative prerogative. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961). Equal protection is violated only if the classification under the statute rests on
grounds "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective ... statutory discrim-
ination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Id. at 425-26. The rational relationship standard has been applied most often in cases involv-
ing economic regulation. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
110 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964).
I" See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
107 Id.
1 The California drunk driving rehabilitation program is codified at CAL. VEH. CODE §
13201.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1977). The program was implemented on January 1, 1976 in four
"demonstration counties" and continued on an experimental basis until December 31, 1977.
On January 1, 1978, the program was expanded to the statewide level. Id.
I0 58 Cal. App. 3d 936, 130 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1976).
"' CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (driving under influence of liquor
or drugs).
M The demonstration program was implemented in only four counties under CAL. VEH.
CODE § 13201.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
1 58 Cal. App. at 940, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
113 Id.
"1 58 Cal. App. at 942, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
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that a DWI offender can challenge the VASAP statute 5 by arguing that
he is a member of a suspect classification or that a fundamental interest
is involved. In Department of Motor Vehicles, the court found no justifica-
tion for the use of either concept to describe the DWI defendant under the
California statute."' In determining whether a fundamental interest exists,
the United States Supreme Court has stated that judges must look to the
Constitution to see if the interest or right claimed is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed therein."7 Under this standard such interests as voting,"' pro-
creation,"9 and rights guaranteed under criminal procedure' 0 have been
recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court. Although the privilege
to drive a car or the right to enter an alcohol safety program may constitute
a cognizable property interest and thereby demand the protection of due
process, those acts do not fall under the classification of fundamental
interests.'2' Such interests involve rights which are specifically expressed
or implicitly considered by the Constitution and come under one of the
traditional guarantees of rights.' Under this standard, the right to enter
VASAP cannot be viewed as fundamental. Similarly, a claim that a DWI
offender is part of a suspect classification would not be viable. Suspect
classifications have been held by the Supreme Court to include race,",
national ancestry,'2 4 and alienage.' 5 Persons arrested while driving under
the influence of alcohol never have been included in this group and the
probability of their inclusion in the future is doubtful.
Since no suspect classification or fundamental interest is involved, a
DWI offender would have to challenge the VASAP statute under the tradi-
tional standard of review.' 6 Under that standard, section 18.2-271.1 of the
Code of Virginia should be upheld if the underlying basis of the differentia-
tion is rationally related to the purposes of the statute.', In applying this
test to both the California alcohol safety program and VASAP, it is clear
that the purposes of the statutes are closely related to the operation of the
programs involved. In Department of Motor Vehicles, the court recognized
the rational relationship between the purpose of the California statute to
,,5 VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
,, 58 Cal. App. at 942, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
,, San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
,,S Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964).
"I Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
'2 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
121 See note 117 supra; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
122 Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the determi-
nation of which interests are fundamental should come from the language of the Constitution.
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissent-
ing).
' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
,2, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
' Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
121 See note 104 supra.
' See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
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experiment with alcohol treatment programs 2 and the drunk driving




Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has upheld state stat-
utes that discriminate among individuals situated in different areas within
a state.'3 1' Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional requirement under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 32 The Court has
recognized that local needs of communities may necessitate differences in
the specific application of state programs and laws to fit those needs.'3 In
Virginia, local communities may have a VASAP program, a program inde-
pendent from the state, or no alcohol safety program at all. Such factors
as the specific need for a local program, the expense of creation and opera-
tion of such a program, and the ability to obtain qualified personnel may
determine what type of program, if any, a community adopts.' 3 Therefore,
the strong possibility exists that a DWI defendant would n6t succeed on
grounds of equal protection in challenging the absence of the VASAP op-
tion in the court in which he was convicted of a DWI violation.
In communities where a VASAP program exists another equal protec-
tion problem arises involving the considerable discretion of the trial judge
in determining a DWI defendant's eligibility for the VASAP program.' 3
'M Under California law, CAL. VEH. CODE § 13201.5(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977), the
intent of the statute and the drunk driver rehabilitation program is to "determine which types
of programs can most effectively provide for treatment of persons convicted" of driving while
intoxicated.
1" 58 Cal. App. 3d at 941-42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 314. Department of Motor Vehicles was
upheld in McGlothlen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 140 Cal. Rptr.
168 (1977). In McGlothlen, the court, on facts similar to Department of Motor Vehicles,
confirmed the rational relationship between the operation of the drunk driver rehabilitation
program and the legitimate purpose of § 13201.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1977). 71 Cal. App. 3d
at 1017.
130 See text accompanying notes 23-33 supra; text accompanying notes 153-58 infra.
M32 Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 550-54 (1954). See People v. McNaught, 31 Cal.
App. 3d 599, 107 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1973); People v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 397, 105
Cal. Rptr. 695 (1972).
2 346 U.S. at 552.
' See Id.
"' Sawyer Interview, supra note 62.
'" Section 18.2-271.1(a) of the Code of Virginia states that a person charged with driving
while intoxicated may enter into an alcohol safety action program "as may in the opinion of
the court be best suited to the needs of such person . . . upon such terms and conditions as
the court may set forth." VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The language gives
nearly complete discretion to the trial judge in the determination of the requirements of
VASAP eligibility of a DWI offender. The only limitation on the court's discretion under the
statute is found in the last sentence of § 18.2-271.1(a): "In the determination of the eligibility
of such person to enter such a program, the court shall consider his prior record of participa-
tion in any other alcoholic rehabilitation program." Id. One question in the VASAP Survey,
supra note 47, asked the following: "Under what conditions, if any, would you permit a repeat
DWI offender who has completed a VASAP program to again enter the program?" Of the
judges who responded, 47.5% indicated that under no condition would they offer the VASAP
option to a repeat DWI offender with previous VASAP or other type of rehabilitative experi-
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This discretion, resulting in different sets of eligibility criteria among
judges in different judicial districts,'36 may lead to the admission of certain
DWI offenders and the exclusion of others. The United States Supreme
Court's holding in Salsburg v. Maryland3 that state laws treating individ-
uals differently in different counties of a state are constitutional, 3 ' is rele-
vant to this particular aspect of VASAP. In Salsburg, a Maryland statute'3'
provided that illegally procured evidence was inadmissible at trial, but
excepted evidence obtained in Anne Arundel County for violations of state
gambling laws. Charged with bookmaking, 4 ' the defendant claimed that
the admission of illegally seized evidence was a denial of equal protection
since the same evidence would have been excluded in other counties. The
Supreme Court held that uniformity of treatment among Maryland coun-
ties was not a prerequisite to the constitutional validity of the statute.'
Accordingly, differences between Virginia judicial districts as to the eligi-
bility requirements for admission into VASAP would not be violative of
ence. Many of the judges answering in the negative felt that rehabilitation was a one-time
opportunity and that further attempts to treat the DWI offender would be fruitless. As one
judge put it, "an individual who has not become 'habilitated' by VASAP or otherwise is not
a subject for further effort to 'rehabilitate.' It's impossible to re-do something never previously
done." VASAP Survey, supra note 47. Many judges felt that the recidivist is undeserving of
another chance.
A slight majority (52.5%) of the judges responding indicated that under certain condi-
tions they would admit a recidivist into VASAP. Prevalent among the reasons given for
possible readmission were the likelihood of success of additional treatment, the attitude and
sincerity of the DWI defendant, and the length of time between the completion of the VASAP
program and the second charge of driving while intoxicated. There was a general consensus
among these judges that the recidivist needs the treatment of an alcohol safety program more
than a one-time offender. One judge stated: "Although we don't like repeaters, these people
need more help than simple one-time offenders." VASAP Survey, supra note 47.
"I In the VASAP Survey, supra note 47, the district court judges who use the program
were asked to list the criteria they used in determining the eligibility of a DWI defendant for
VASAP. Seventeen identifiable criteria were obtained from the responses collected. Some of
the criteria listed were: the danger of letting the DWI defendant onto the road again; the
attitude of the defendant; the defendant's prior VASAP record; the blood alcohol concontra-
tion level of the defendant at the time of arrest; the occupation of the defendant; the facts
and circumstances of the arrest, including information contained in the arresting officer's
report; the defendant's driving record; the alcohol history of the defendant and his need for
VASAP treatment; employment history of the defendant; the financial situation of the defen-
dant and the DWI defendant's need for his driver's license. Id.
137 346 U.S. 543 (1954).
I" Id. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra. Many decisions following Salsburg are
illustrative of the Court's holding that differences in a state statute's treatment of individuals
in different jurisdictions are not violative of equal protection. See e.g., Griffin v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), rev'g Griffin v. Borad of Supervisors, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.
1963); State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So. 2d 135 (1966); State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 173
So. 2d 192 (1965); Becker v. Levitt, 81 Misc. 2d 664, 366 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1975).
' MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 5 (1951), currently codified at MD. EVIDENCE CODE ANN. art.
35, § 5(c) (Repl. Vol. 1971).
24' MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 306 (1951), currently codified at MD. CRIM. LAw CODE ANN.
art. 27, § 240 (Repl. Vol. 1976).




The payment of VASAP entry fees also raises constitutional problems
of equal protection. Every DWI defendant entering the program is required
to pay a fee of not more than $200 to help cover the expense of his rehabili-
tation.' While the VASAP statute allows for payment of amounts less
than $200, many judges require all DWI defendants who choose the
VASAP option to remit the maximum amount.' This requirement may
be violative of equal protection since the full amount may be beyond the
means of a DWI defendant of indigent status, thus effectively denying him
entry into the program.' Such an. indigent would be precluded from the
opportunity of rehabilitative treatment and found guilty of driving while
intoxicated, while others with sufficient ability to pay the maximum fee
could enter VASAP and have their DWI charges reduced upon successful
completion of the program. Although wealth or indigency has been held
to be a suspect classification by the Supreme Court,"' this distinction has
been applied only in limited instances.47 Wealth, or the lack thereof, has
come under the suspect classification concept in cases where the status of
indigency has affected some area considered to be fundamental in na-
ture.' Examples of such areas have been the right to vote"' and the right
to an appeal by a criminal defendant.5 ' In cases where such basic rights
are not affected, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to apply the sus-
pect classification concept on the basis of wealth.15 ' In the case of the DWI
"I The equal protection clause relates to equality between persons, rather than between
geographic areas. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1879). The Supreme Court expressed
the view that:
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons .
the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these
respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary line ... If diversi-
ties of laws ... may exist in the several States without violating the equality clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no solid reason why there may not be such
diversities in different parts of the same State.
Id. at 31.
US VA. CoDs § 18.2-271.1(al) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
" See note 51 supra.
'4 Id.
24 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"7 Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (indigency and the right to criminal
appeal); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (indigency and the right to
vote).
I's Although wealth has been held to be a suspect classification in certain instances, see
notes 146-47 supra, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to make it a per se classification
such as it has done with race. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29
(1973). Recent analysis by the Court has required some fundamental right or interest to be
associated with the status of wealth. In effect, it requires the indigent to meet the standards
of both a fundamental right and a suspect classification before strict scrutiny will be applied.
See notes 100-01 supra.
"' McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See note 147, supra.
"I Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
222 The Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand the scope of fundamental interests
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offender of indigent status, the right to enter VASAP does not appear to
be so fundamental as to warrant the application of a suspect classification
or a fundamental interest.'
5 2
Since neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental interest ap-
plies, the DWI defendant would have to challenge the VASAP statute'53
under the traditional standard of review and a judge would have to deter-
mine if the distinctions permitted by section 18.2-271.1 of the Code of
Virginia bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state goal.'5 4
VASAP is violative of the equal protection clause only if its intent and
purpose are totally unrelated to that goal.'55 The stated goal of the High-
way Safety Division regarding VASAP is to lower the total number of
alcohol-related deaths on Virginia roads.' 6 The means to accomplish that
goal is the operation of the VASAP program and other local alcohol safety
programs'57 throughout the Commonwealth. It is difficult to deny the exist-
ence of a rational relationship between the goal of lowering alcohol-related
automobile fatalities and the implementation of an alcohol safety action
program for persons convicted of driving while intoxicated.
Although there are possible constitutional issues of due process and
equal protection, it appears that the VASAP program would withstand a
challenge on either ground. 51 VASAP is not a complete solution to the
dangers posed by the drunk driver,'5 but is a viable alternative to tradi-
tional DWI punitive sanctions which have proven ineffective in reducing
alcohol-related fatalities on the highways."' Although the program is not
a guarantee that fatal highway crashes will decrease, VASAP does offer the
and suspect classifications to prevent discouraging legislatures from passing laws in those
areas. A major example of this limitation is found in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), where the Court refused to extend a fundamental right to
include education and a suspect classification to include wealth standing alone. In San
Antonio, a class action was brought on behalf of school children from poor families. The
families resided in the low income school district in San Antonio which had a low property
tax base. Since each school district supplemented state aid to district public schools through
an ad valorem tax on property within the district, those districts with a lower tax base
generated less revenue for public education than other areas. Plaintiffs claimed that this
reliance on local property taxation favored the more affluent and violated equal protection
because of the substantial disparities between districts in "per pupil" expenditures. Id. at 6-
18. The Supreme Court held education was not a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution, id. at 33-34, and that a classification based on wealth stand-
ing alone was not suspect. Id. at 28-29. See note 122 supra.
155 See text accompanying notes 115-22 supra.
15 VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
,s, McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
15 Id. See also Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957). For a discussion of traditional
and emerging standards of review under the equal protection clause, see Wilkinson, The
Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
"' See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
15T Id.
'8 See text accompanying notes 88 & 142 supra.
'9 See note 32 supra.
185 See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
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DWI offender a chance for rehabilitation before his driving privileges are
reinstated.'"' It represents a new concept in highway safety and any one
commenting on the success of VASAP must recognize that it may take
many years before significant statistical results can be obtained.,"
While the majority of General District Court judges believe that
VASAP has been a success,' 3 there are improvements which could help the
program achieve its desired goals more efficiently. The decision to permit
a DWI defendant to enter VASAP should not be one left to the wide
discretion of trial judges. The only guideline given by the state legislature
in section 18.2-271.1 for determining a defendant's eligibility for the pro-
gram is that the trial judge may consider the defendant's prior record of
participation in an alcohol rehabilitation program.'64 Given a free hand to
determine the defendant's eligibility, Virginia judges have used many
combinations of eligibility criteria, ranging from the defendant's attitude
to his BAC level at the time of arrest.' 5 The procedures employed by the
judges when dealing with repeat DWI defendants who have already com-
pleted VASAP is even more varied.'66 If the program is to operate success-
fully, the eligibility criteria used by the judges should be uniform. Trial
judges could still retain some discretion in making VASAP decisions
through their interpretation of the guidelines set by the legislature. Three
eligibility criteria which are presently used by a number of the judges are
the defendant's driving record, his level of alcohol use, and prior VASAP
participation.' 7 The General Assembly could incorporate these and other
criteria it deems necessary into the present language of section 18.2-271.1.
Several other differences among judges making VASAP-related decisions,
such as the requirement of a guilty plea, 66 the terms and conditions of the
" See note 33 supra.
162 See note 32 supra.
"3 Of the judges who responded to the survey, 60.9% believed that the VASAP program
had been successful, 8.7% said it had not, and 28.3% of the judges felt it was too early to
make a valid conclusion since the program has been in existence for such a short duration.
Among the judges who felt VASAP has not been successful, most believed that it cut back
on the punishment that DWI offenders deserve. VASAP Survey, supra note 47. For example,
one judge stated that it limits "drunk driving law enforcement without any proven beneficial
results ... It is being used as an escape from punishment." Id.
The majority of the judges answering the survey, however, were enthusiastic about the
direction and purpose of the program. Many see VASAP as a necessary alternative to the
traditional penalties imposed on drunk drivers. Two judges indicated that in several cases,
serious DWI offenders have continued a close association with Alcoholics Anonymous after
completing the program. One judge mentioned that several individuals have become involved
with the local program as counselors or assistants. The strongest support for VASAP came
from a judge who wrote, "I consider the program to be the most successful and the most
beneficial program I have ever seen in the criminal justice system." Id.
"' VA. CODE § 18.2-271.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
", VASAP Survey, supra note 47. See note 136, supra.
661 See note 135 supra. Approximately one-half of the judges allow these defendants into
VASAP a second time upon certain varied conditions. VASAP Survey, supra note 47.
"3Id.
"I Id. See notes 50, 51, 56, & 72-91 supra.
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DWI defendant's probation, the assessment of the VASAP fee, the quant-
ity of information that judges receive regarding a defendant's progress in
the program, and the rights given disobedient VASAP probationers, also
call for guidance from the legislature. Presently, section 18.2-271.1 leaves
these matters solely in the hands of the trial judge and exercise of discre-
tion by a trial judge in this area has never been overturned.
The promising results of the VASAP program thus far have been due
in large part to the willingness of most district court judges to offer the
VASAP option to DWI offenders.' VASAP will have greater success, how-
ever, if it is available to all first-time DWI offenders on a statewide basis. 7
Section 18.2-271.1 should require that all first-time DWI offenders in Vir-
ginia be offered the VASAP option.' The goal of reducing the number of
highway fatalities related to the use of alcohol' can best be achieved
through an alcohol safety action program that reaches the greatest number
of people who need it.
HARvEY GRANGER IV
JAMES C. OLSON
"' See note 47 supra.
110 At the present time the program does not exist in some areas, and some judges who
have the alternative of offering VASAP, do not offer it to all DWI offenders who fail the
judge's eligibility criteria. See note 136 supra.
"I Virtually all of the judges surveyed agreed with the statement: "The trial judge should
be permitted to retain the flexibility that he now has under section 18.2-271.1 in offering the
VASAP option." Approximately three-fourths of the judges disagreed with the statement:
"The VASAP program should be mandatory for all first-time DWI offenders in Virginia."
VASAP Survey, supra note 47.
72 See note 27 supra.
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